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Food Aid Targeting, Shocks and Private Transfers 





Abstract:   Public transfers of food aid are intended largely to support vulnerable 
populations in times of stress. We use high frequency panel data 
among Ethiopian and Kenyan pastoralists to test the efficacy of food 
aid targeting under three different targeting modalities, food aid’s 
responsiveness to different types of shocks, and its relationship to 
private transfers. We find that, in this region, self-targeting food-for-
work or indicator-targeted free food distribution more effectively 
reach the poor than does food aid distributed according to 
community-based targeting.  Food aid flows do not respond 
significantly to either covariate, community-level income or asset 
shocks.  Rather, food aid flows appear to respond mainly to more 
readily observable rainfall measures.  Finally, food aid does not 
appear to affect private transfers in any meaningful way, either by 
crowding out private gifts to recipient households nor by stimulating 
increased gifts by food aid recipients. 
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I. Introduction 
Public transfers are intended to assist the poor, to insure against adverse shocks, or 
both.  There has long been widespread concern about the efficacy of targeting transfers 
and the prospect that public transfers may be effectively neutralized by compensatory 
reductions in private transfers.   
Food aid represents a primary form of transfers in many low-income, rural 
communities around the world, perhaps especially in East Africa. Ethiopia is now the 
largest food aid recipient worldwide and Kenya, Sudan and other states in the region rely 
disproportionately on international food aid for public transfers to rural inhabitants. 
However, the international development community has long expressed a range of 
concerns about food aid, including the fear that food aid breeds “dependency”, 
commercial trade displacement, its misuse by warring parties in conflict settings, and its 
efficacy in reaching the poorest. Barrett (2002) argues that the root of these prospective 
problems lies in targeting errors in food aid distribution and operational agencies
1 show a 
growing interest in assessing and improving the efficacy of food aid targeting. 
The efficacy of food aid targeting depends on at least three factors.  First, how is the 
targeting done? A significant literature on different targeting modalities has emerged over 
the past fifteen years, with a push among operational agencies first to self-targeting and 
indicator targeting and, most recently, for community based targeting (Barrett and 
Maxwell forthcoming, Coady et al. 2003).  As yet, there remains scant empirical 
evidence directly comparing performance under alternative targeting modalities.   
                                                 
1 We use the term “operational agencies,” as is custom among field practitioners to encompass both 
international NGOs and UN agencies (e.g. UNICEF and WFP), or government entities that distribute food 
to individual recipients.  3
Second, how do public transfers affect private flows? Is there “crowding out” of 
private flows by public ones, as some previous studies have found (Cox et al. 2004, 
Dercon and Krishnan 2003, Cox and Jimenez 1995), or might there even be “pass 
through” wherein non-needy recipients of public transfers increase the private transfers 
they make to needy households in response to direct targeting errors? Current enthusiasm 
for community-based targeting, depends, in part, on an untested hypothesis that non-
trivial “pass-through” occurs, i.e., that private transfers effectively redistribute public 
transfers so that resources passed through are in effect indirect transfers to the poor 
mediated through non-needy unintended beneficiaries.  
Third, external assistance is arguably most necessary in response to (or in anticipation 
of) covariate shocks that limit the ability of households within a community to assist 
family, friends, and neighbors (Dercon forthcoming). Given the typically superior 
information households have about one another relative to the information readily 
available to outside operational agencies, private inter-household transfers (so-called 
“social insurance”) are typically better instruments for addressing idiosyncratic, 
household-level shocks than are external injections of resources. This paper explores 
these three key topics: how efficacy varies by targeting modality, how food aid flows 
affect private transfers, and how food aid responds to shocks. 
Our data set covers nearly 300 households in ten northern Kenyan and southern 
Ethiopian communities interviewed quarterly between June 2000 and December 2001. As 
such, this study is one of the few panel data analyses of food aid anywhere and the only 
one at reasonably high frequency and with a significant number of repeated observations 
across households. Moreover, we focus on pastoral households in the arid and semi-arid  4
lands (ASAL), the region’s subpopulation that is both most subject to climatic shocks and 
of greatest current concern among donors regarding prospective food aid dependency. 
Panel data permit us to estimate shocks and to control effectively for both time-varying 
factors such as rainfall or violence in determining food aid flows and observable and 
unobservable community-level factors (e.g., NGO presence, accessibility, leadership 
quality, social cohesion) that likely affect both external food aid transfers and inter-
household redistribution within the community.   
We also benefit from a quasi-natural experimental design as these data span three 
different targeting modalities, enabling direct exploration of differences due to targeting 
methods. In southern Ethiopia, food aid flowed to households through either self-
targeting food-for-work schemes (FFW)
2 or free food distribution (FFD) relying on 
indicator targeting based on age and gender of the household head or the presence of 
children in the household, with no work requirement. Meanwhile, food aid distribution in 
our northern Kenya sites has moved to community-based targeting (CBT), wherein 
outside agencies eschew direct household level targeting, which is decided entirely by the 
recipient community. Generally, the northern Kenyan communities distribute food 
uniformly across households, pro-rated based on an often outdated
3 roster of registered 
household headcounts, due to pressures within communities to share resources equally 
among all residents.  
Although equal division of transfers across households is not unique to this setting, it 
is not a necessary nor a ubiquitous feature of CBT. Assessments of other CBT programs 
                                                 
2 The FFW wage and length of work are exogenously determined by the project and thus can properly be 
taken as exogenous to the household’s choice in this analysis. 
3 McPeak notes that 1996 census figures were used in Kenyan regional center Marsabit for food aid 
allocations during 2000-2002 (personal communication).  5
have found that communities, schools, or religious organizations target the poorest 
households relatively well (see Conning and Kevane (2001) for a good review of the 
evidence). Because the form of CBT employed by communities in our study does not 
attempt to target the poor, the results of our analysis of CBT are directly applicable only 
to communities engaging in equal distribution of transfers. Further, because of 
widespread poverty and heavy concentration of activity on herding, pastoral communities 
are often considered by donors organizations to be homogenous in spite of considerable 
within-community variability in income, risk exposure, etc.
4  Rather than incur the high 
costs of reaching difficult-to-identify poor households via FFW or FFD, donors may 
propose CBT to these communities. While CBT places the responsibility to target 
effectively on the shoulders of the community rather than the donors, it may be equally 
difficult for the community to target effectively. This non-random application of CBT to 
hard-to-target communities may impact its targeting performance.  Thus, CBT’s 
performance relative to FFW and FFD may be caused more by placement effects of 
communities that are difficult to target to rather than by inadequate targeting.  We have 
no means to control for placement effects, so this key caveat must be borne in mind as we 
discuss empirical results.  Finally, the existing literature offers no evidence as to whether 
community-based food aid targeting works better than more conventional methods, as 
some analysts claim it does for other forms of transfer in other settings (Alderman, 2002). 
Several recent studies have examined the efficacy of food aid targeting in Ethiopia, 
questioning both the determination of which communities should be eligible for food aid 
and which households within a community should be the food aid recipients (Clay et al., 
                                                 
4 For example, Smith et al. (2001) demonstrate considerable inter-household variation in risk assessments 
in pastoral communities.  6
1999; Jayne et al., 2001; Jayne et al., 2002; Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2001).  In 
assessing the efficacy of food aid targeting, most previous studies have employed hurdle 
models (Jayne et al., 2001; Clay et al., 1999; Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2001; Dercon 
and Krishnan 2003).
5  We suggest, rather, that a household’s decision of whether to 
accept food or not is made with foreknowledge of an approximate quantity that will be 
received and thus, that whether a household received food aid and the quantity received 
should be modeled jointly. We therefore opt for censored regression methods for 
estimating household food aid receipts as a function of household characteristics, 
including income and wealth, both potentially endogenous regressors, for which we 
instrument, and community- and household-level shocks. We also interact our variables 
with indicators for each of the three targeting regimes (community based targeting in 
northern Kenya, and food-for-work and free food distribution in southern Ethiopia) to 
establish whether targeting differs across distribution mechanisms.   
The ultimate efficacy of targeting depends not only on the direct distribution of public 
aid but also on their impact on private transfers, which can either take the form of income 
effects, in which receiving food aid “frees up” resources that are then transferred to needy 
households or substitution effects in which food aid at least partly replaces private 
transfers. We refer to the former case as the “pass-through” of transfers and the latter case 
as the “crowding out” of transfers.   
Anecdotal evidence from northern Kenya (Reed 2001, Aklilu and Wekesa 2001) 
suggests that social safety nets, particularly transfers between relatives and neighbors, 
                                                 
5 Hurdle models are two step processes. First the probability of a household receiving food aid is estimated 
using a probit model. Then, for households receiving food aid, the quantity of food aid received is 
estimated using generalized least squares.  7
provide an important coping mechanism for households.
6 Our data confirm the existence 
of extensive transfer networks. During the survey period, over 65 percent of Kenyan and 
nearly 30 percent of Ethiopian households surveyed report exchanging money, livestock, 
or uncooked food, not including items loaned or borrowed.  
In a growing body of literature, some researchers have found that public transfers at 
least partly crowd out private transfers within communities receiving transfers (Albarran 
and Attanasio 2001; Cox et al. 2004; Dercon and Krishnan 2003).  However, the extant 
literature on crowding out of private transfers is hampered by lack of data which tracks 
both private transfer and public transfer information or it relies on limited transfer data. 
We have data on monetary and all major non-monetary transfers, such as food and 
livestock, in our survey communities. After including proper controls for a range of other 
covariates likely to affect inter-household transfers both given and received, we can test 
directly whether food aid receipts have any pass through or crowding out effects on 
private transfers.  Further, we can break out food transfers from all transfers, which 
include cash and livestock, in order to test for possible limits to fungibility in the form of 
transfer.  
Relatively little research explicitly examines shocks impact private and public 
transfers.  Theory clearly suggests that households use private transfers to address 
idiosyncratic shocks through social insurance schemes (Coate and Ravallion 1993). Yet, 
social insurance arrangements may not offer adequate protection to members of groups 
                                                 
6 In most of the research examining food aid targeting or public transfer’s impacts on private transfers, 
including ours, a “community” is identified in geographic terms based on data collection protocols. This 
community may not be the same as a social insurance network defined by the households interviewed 
(Santos 2003). For example, clan or kin based networks may play a stronger role in buffering a household 
against shocks than do geographic neighbors.  The data we use were not collected in a way that permits 
identification of non-geographic communities. This may well mute the effects of private transfers in this 
and all preceding analyses that likewise rely on geographic identification of transfer networks.  8
facing covariate shocks, and may break down during significant covariate shocks 
(Jimenez et. al., 2002).  Public transfers can play an effective role in complementing 
private transfer arrangements in so far as public transfers can respond to covariate shocks 
that may limit local households’ capacity to smooth consumption through social 
insurance.  We adapt a method previously employed to study food aid’s responsiveness to 
macro-level shocks (Barrett 2001, Barrett and Heisey 2002) to construct measures of 
covariate and idiosyncratic shocks for each household in each survey round, enabling us 
to examine, for the first time, how public and private transfers respond to idiosyncratic 
and covariate shocks. Moreover, by interacting predicted food aid receipts with measures 
of covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, we can also establish whether the prospective 
crowding out or pass through effects of public transfers vary according to the nature of 
local income and asset shocks.   
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we explain 
our econometric strategy for tackling these issues. Section III describes the data. Section 
IV presents estimation results and section V concludes.  
 
II. Econometric Strategy 
Our objective in this paper is to explore four interrelated issues regarding food aid as 
it is practiced among pastoralist communities in the arid and semi-arid lands of East 
Africa.  First, we wish to take advantage of unprecedented availability of detailed panel 
data to look anew at the efficacy of household-level food aid targeting.  Second, we want 
to take advantage of the quasi-natural experiment in our data to look for prospective 
differences in efficacy by targeting modality (CBT, FFD or FFW).  Third, high frequency  9
panel data enable us to study food aid’s responsiveness to shocks in a way that has never 
been done at micro-level.  Finally, we seek to test whether these data support the 
hypothesis that public aid flows crowd out private transfers as well as the more novel 
hypothesis relating public and private transfers, that unintended beneficiaries effectively 
“pass through” windfall aid receipts to other households, which could provide an indirect 
targeting correction for at least some direct targeting errors. 
These objectives require addressing a host of econometric challenges related to the 
panel nature of the data, the potential endogeneity of income and assets with respect to 
food aid flows and of food aid receipts with respect to private transfers, the need to 
estimate unobservable shocks and to decompose them by type (idiosyncratic versus 
covariate, asset versus income), as well as the censored nature of the food aid receipts 
and private transfer gross inflows and gross outflows dependent variables we study.  This 
section explains our strategy for resolving these challenges. 
  
A. Estimating income, assets and shocks 
Food aid receipts are likely codetermined with contemporaneously observed 
household income and assets. For example, food aid may improve nutrient intake, 
resulting in increased worker productivity and therefore increased income.  Furthermore, 
many pastoralists do not visit towns often and may link a trip to a food distribution center 
with other in-town activities, such as trading or selling animals or animal products, so as 
to justify the fixed transaction costs associated with travel. Income and assets may thus 
be endogenous regressors in the determination of a household’s food aid receipts.  We  10
use standard instrumental variables estimation methods to resolve this problem
7 and, in 
so doing, we also create the asset and income shock variables we need to test for food 
aid’s responsiveness to shocks.  
We estimate separate instrumenting equations for income
8 and livestock holdings, the 
chief asset held by sample households, and then compute asset and income shocks based 
on the decomposed residuals from the instrumenting equations. Our model for 
instrumented income is:
  
Yijt=α + βijXijt + λjt + ρijt                                            (1) 
and Yijt is income for household i from community j at time t.  The matrix of regressors 
Xijt includes household size, gender of the household head, age and age-squared of the 
head of household, the number of children in a household, the previous and current 
quarter’s rainfall (mm) and indicator variables for possession of a bank account, 
insecurity in the previous quarter, country of residence (Kenya=1) the previous quarter’s 
income, and a vector of time-and-location specific fixed effects, λjt, one for each of the 60 
quarter and region combinations (10 regions and 6 quarters, with the base case Wachille 
for the quarter ending September 2000). These fixed effects capture local supply and 
demand conditions that vary over space and season, such as forage availability, prices, 
crime and weather patterns, inter-clan or inter-ethnic disputes, etc.  The residual, ρijt, is 
the mean zero residual portion of income not explained by these instruments.  
                                                 
7 We address the potential endogeneity of some other regressors by using just observations from the 
baseline survey round, which predates the flow measures of transfers we use as dependent variables.  This 
is our strategy with respect to household composition or the household’s possession of a commercial bank 
account, for example.  
8 Income is the sum of auto-consumed home production (milk, meat and maize), cash income from non-
livestock activities and enterprises (e.g. wages, salaries, and proceeds from charcoal production, firewood 
collection, hides, or crafts), and livestock sales and slaughter.  We exclude private transfers and food aid 
receipts from income so as to avoid spurious correlation between income and those dependent variables.  11
In addition to time-and-location specific fixed effects, we also control for household-
specific random effects. Random effects are unobserved effects uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables, allowing the econometrician to control for “any remaining serial 
correlation due to unobserved time-constant factors” (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 288).
9  
Following standard panel data econometric techniques, the unexplained portion, ρijt¸ can 
be decomposed into two parts: 
ρijt = θijt + ψijt                                                                                     (2) 
where ψijt is the universal random error for household i in community j during time t and  
θijt is each household’s random effect.  
Beyond simply controlling for the panel nature of the data, we can also decompose 
the error term into household-specific (idiosyncratic) and community-specific (covariate) 
shocks.
10 Covariate shocks, εjt, reflect the period-specific mean deviation from expected 
income in community j: 
εjt =  ∑ =   +  
j N
1 i
ijt ijt j ) ψ (θ ) N 1 (                                                 (3) 
The covariate shock estimate is thus the mean unexplained portion of income in each 
community each period. We then define the idiosyncratic income shock as the remaining 
unexplained portion of household income, i.e., as from the difference between equations 
(2) and (3): 
                                                 
9 Note that we use household specific random effects because there is no unbiased parametric fixed effects 
estimator for Tobit models. 
10 One could alternatively try to include measures of observable shocks (e.g., rainfall, quarantines, raids) 
directly.  But since conceptually transfers are meant to flow in response to welfare shocks experienced by 
households rather than observable, largely community-scale events that may be only weakly correlated 
with individual level welfare (Smith et al. 2001, Lybbert et al. 2004), the approach of using the unexplained 
component of income makes more sense, as Barrett (2001) argues.  This seems borne out by (unreported) 
results.  When we estimate food aid receipts without the computed shock terms, substituting instead a 
vector of exogenous shock proxies (e.g., raids, quarantines), the results proved nonsensical.  12
εijt ≡  Yijt -   ijt Y ˆ  - εjt ≡  ρijt - εjt                              (4) 
where  ijt Y ˆ  is the fitted value from equation (1).  The idiosyncratic shock estimate, εijt, is 
thus the deviation of each household i’s income in community j at time t from its 
expected value conditional on the covariate shock estimate, εjt.  Because idiosyncratic 
shock estimates absorb the measurement error in income, this may bias towards zero the 
coefficient estimates relating idiosyncratic income shocks to food aid or to private 
transfers similar to an errors-in-variables problem. Therefore, little weight should be 
placed on the estimated relationship between idiosyncratic shocks and food aid or 
transfers. We therefore do not discuss those results. Our primary interest lays with the 
relationship between food aid and covariate shocks to which food aid flows are meant to 
respond. 
We follow precisely the same process to instrument for asset holdings, measured in 
tropical livestock units (TLUs),
11 and to estimate the idiosyncratic asset shock, φijt, and 
the covariate asset shock, φjt for each household and time period. These covariate and 
idiosyncratic asset and income shocks, as well as predicted income and herd size values, 
are key regressors in our subsequent estimation of the efficacy of food aid targeting, its 
responsiveness to shocks and its effects on private transfers.  Once again, we ignore the 
coefficient estimates on the idiosyncratic asset shock variable because they will be biased 
toward zero by measurement error. 
 
B. Estimating Household-Level Food Aid Receipts 
                                                 
11 A TLU conversion assigns metabolic equivalence weights to each type of livestock where 1 TLU = 1 
Cattle = 0.7 Camels = 10 Goats = 10 Sheep.  13
Given our estimates of household-level expected assets and income, and covariate 
and idiosyncratic asset and income shocks, we can now study the efficacy of household-
level food aid distribution conditional on targeting modality and food aid’s 
responsiveness to shocks.  We use a censored (Tobit) regression model to determine the 
expected value of food aid conditional on food aid receipt.   Households who did not 
receive aid have left censored observations equal to zero while the value of food aid 
received is used for recipient households.
 12  
Our regression model thus takes the standard form, with continuous latent food aid 
receipts, FAijt
*, a function of observable and instrumented regressors, with a censoring 















*          if FAijt
*>0  
          FAijt =0     if FAijt
* ≤  0                                        (6) 
                                                  
The regressors, Xijt, include predicted income and assets, covariate and idiosyncratic 
income and asset shocks, household size, gender of the household head, age and age-
squared of the head of household, the number of children in a household, last quarter’s 
aid receipts, previous and current quarter’s rainfall (in mm), as well as an intercept term. 
In order to understand how distinct food aid targeting modalities affect food aid receipt, 
we employ a partial switching regression specification, interacting each Xijt with an 
indicator variable indicating whether the household resided in a community using 
                                                 
12 We value food aid receipts for the primary goods received: maize and wheat. Food aid can be 
supplemented with very small quantities of oil, beans, and unimix (a blended fortified food). However, we 
lack price information for these products. Therefore, the value of food aid is slightly underreported. We use 
our community maize prices to value wheat, for which prices were not collected, using a adjustment factor 
of wheat to maize prices for Ethiopia. In 1999-2000, using Ethiopian commodity price data supplied by 
Michigan State University for Ethiopia as a whole, the unconditional mean ratio of wheat/maize prices (i.e., 
the ratio of birr/kg prices) was 1.459.  14
community-based targeting (CBT), free food distribution (FFD) or food-for-work self-
targeting (FFW) mechanisms during the period.
13  We only use a partial switching 
regression specification because three household attributes, X
NI – possession of a bank 
account, town-based employment, and insecurity in the previous quarter – are unrelated 
to targeting efforts and thus we impose the assumption that the effects of these variables 
do not vary across targeting modalities. We continue to use random effects, now in 
conjunction with location-specific fixed effects, ζj, to control for any remaining 
nonspherical errors.
14  This specification allows us to examine at once how food aid 
receipts vary with household and community characteristics, modality of transfers, and 
covariate or idiosyncratic income or asset shocks. 
 
C. Estimating Private Transfers 
In order to examine food aid’s prospective impacts on private transfers, we regress 
the latter on predicted food aid receipts – thereby controlling for the obvious endogeneity 
of food aid – and predicted food aid interacted with idiosyncratic and covariate income 
and asset shocks.
15 The linear term allows us to test the crowding out and pass through 
hypotheses directly, while the interaction terms allow for prospective change in those 
                                                 
13 CBT was in force in our northern Kenya locations throughout the survey period.  In southern Ethiopia, 
both FFD and FFW were available in each community at different points in time.  No households 
simultaneously received both types of food aid. Households who received one form of aid in a period were 
assigned a zero for the other sort of aid that period, while all other households in southern Ethiopia were 
classified as eligible and thus were assigned an indicator value of one. There are obvious possibilities for 
program placement effects because operational agencies’ choice of CBT versus FFW or FFD methods is 
not completely random as well as selection effects, because households choice to participate in FFW 
instead of FFD, or vice versa, need not be random either.  However, we have no suitable instruments in 
these data with which we could instrument for the selection effect within these communities, nor do we 
have data on other communities that could be used to identify the prospective placement effects.  
14 We do not use time-and-location fixed effects for the food aid and private transfers equations due to too 
few observations in each time-location subsample after breaking out food aid into three forms of targeting. 
15 For less than half of the censored households, 422 of 1050, the predicted value was negative. Because we 
do not observe negative food aid, we convert these negative values to zero predicted food aid.  15
effects due to shocks. This admits the possibility, for example, that food aid crowds out 
private transfers only in the presence of negative covariate shocks that leave most 
households in a community worse off.  We estimate separate equations for gross transfers 
given and gross transfers received.  Since both of these dependent variables are left-
censored at zero, we again use the partial switching Tobit specification with location-
specific fixed effects and household-level random effects.    
We use two different, nested measures of transfers. The first is transfers of food, 
including uncooked grains, sugar, and milk.
16 Estimation results for this narrowly defined 
form show whether food aid affects transfers to or from other households in effectively 
the form in which it was received. The second measure aggregates the value of all non-
loan transfers: cash, food, and livestock. This broader measure reveals whether food aid 
affects transfers in a more fungible way.  





FFD(FFDijtZijt) +  βij
NIZijt + ζit
RFT +ρijt
RFT        
RFTijt = RFTijt
*   if RFTijt
*>0  
RFTijt = 0     if RFTijt
* ≤  0                                                                                 (7) 
 
where Zijt ≡ Xijt~  ijt A F ˆ ~ ijt A F ˆ Ψ ijt, the vector Ψ ijt ≡ φijt~ φjt~ εijt~εjt encompasses the 
idiosyncratic and covariate asset and income shocks, and RFT it
* is the latent value of 
food transfers received.  it A F ˆ  is the predicted values of food aid receipt from the direct 
targeting equation. The Xit regressors are the same as for the food aid Tobit, excluding 
the previous quarter’s rainfall, which effectively serves as the identifying instrument for 
food aid receipts.  The ijt A F ˆ Ψ ijt element of Zijt allows for the effects of food aid to vary 
                                                 
16 We are constrained to estimating food transfers as the values of sugar, milk, and maize received, due to 
lack of prices for other products, such as tea, legumes, and oil. But, these latter products are a very minor 
component of recorded inter-household flows.  16
potentially with the shocks experienced by households and communities. Because very 
few transfers were made either to or by FFW recipient households, we have too few 
observations to estimate FFW interaction terms separately.  We therefore allow only for 
an intercept shift associated with FFW participation.  
We follow this same estimation strategy for the three remaining private gross transfer 
dependent variables: all transfers received, RATijt, food transfers given, GFTijt, and all 
transfers given, GATijt.  The key variables of interest concern the relationship between 
ijt A F ˆ  and each of the private transfer dependent variables.  The coefficient relating  ijt A F ˆ  
to transfers received addresses the crowding out hypothesis, which would imply a 
negative and statistically significant point estimate.  The coefficient relating  ijt A F ˆ  to 
transfers given speaks to the pass-through hypothesis, which would imply a positive and 
statistically significant point estimate.  The terms interacting  ijt A F ˆ  with different shocks 
allow for crowding out or pass through effects to vary with spatiotemporal conditions.  
This specification permits us to disentangle food aid’s multiple prospective impacts on 
private transfers, controlling for crucial intertemporal variation in conditions and in key 
unobservable covariates at community-level.  
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our data are unique among evaluations of food aid in that we have a panel of 
observations spanning across two countries, three different targeting modalities, and eight 
quarters, March 2000 through December 2001, during which a severe drought affected 
the surveyed communities. The data were collected from both communities and 
households as part of the USAID Global Livestock Collaborative Research Support  17
Program (GL CRSP) “Improving Pastoral Risk Management on East African 
Rangelands” (PARIMA) project.   
We use household and community-level data collected during seven quarterly survey 
rounds between June 2000 and December 2001 following the baseline survey of these 
households in March 2000.  All prices were reported in Kenyan shillings and Ethiopian 
birr, then converted to U.S. dollars using June 2000 exchange rates.
17 
The ten survey communities lie in a contiguous zone spanning arid and semi-arid 
lands (ASAL) in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia lacking basic infrastructure and 
far removed from their respective capitals.  Ethnic groups span communities on both 
sides of the border, with the ethno-linguistic and agro-ecological similarities making 
comparisons across the study region feasible, if imperfect.  Food aid shipments have 
become a regular – and controversial – part of the landscape in these areas, which are 
regularly buffeted by droughts, disease outbreaks and armed violence.  The five Kenyan 
locations –  Kargi (KG), Logologo (LL), N’gambo (NG), North Horr (NH) and Suguta 
Marmar (SM) – all used community based targeting to distribute food aid during the 
survey period.  The five Ethiopian locations Dida Hara (DH), Dillo (DL), Finchawa (FN), 
Qorate (QR) and Wachille (WA) – all had both food-for-work and free food distribution 
programs in place at different times during the survey.   This creates a quasi-natural 
experiment for studying differences in transfer efficacy by targeting modality. 
Our sample comprises an unbalanced panel of 1560 observations across 288 
households. The average household was interviewed for 5.4 out of a possible six 
                                                 
17 $0.123 = 1 Ethiopian Birr; $0.0129 = 1 Kenyan Shilling on June 15, 2000 
(http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory). Inflation was low during the survey period and no credible 
deflators are available for these regions of Ethiopia and Kenya.  Therefore, we did not deflate nominal 
values.  18
quarters,
18 with over 70 percent interviewed for all six quarters and over 97 percent for at 
least four quarters. There nonetheless was some survey attrition or interruption,
19 most 
likely because households migrated out of the community. Because migration may be 
correlated with food aid receipts ( e.g., due to rainfall quantity or timing, insecurity, 
changes in employment opportunities or status, livestock holdings, etc.), and with some 
of our regressors, non-random sample attrition could yield biased and inconsistent 
regression parameter estimation if we do not control for attrition through  a selection 
equation. However, all of the candidate variables identifying the selection effect (whether 
they participated in a survey for a particular quarter) are also related to food aid receipts.  
Without suitable instruments to control for prospective attrition bias, we must simply rely 
on recent empirical findings from panel data sets in developing countries that “even when 
attrition is fairly high, … [it] is not a general and pervasive problem for obtaining 
consistent [parameter] estimates” (Alderman et al. 2000 p.23), and that “survey attrition 
does not have a major impact on the estimates of equations of schooling attainment, labor 
force participation, self-employment, wages and fertility” (Falaris, 2002, p.133).  
Before turning to the estimation results, we present descriptive statistics, first for 
Kenya and Ethiopia separately, and then differentiated by targeting modality (CBT, FFW, 
FFD) for food aid recipients. Household income was much lower in Ethiopia than in 
Kenya (Table 1). The mean and median Kenyan household received over three times 
more income than its respective Ethiopian household. Mean Ethiopian herds were also 
smaller than in Kenya, although the median Ethiopian household has a slightly higher 
                                                 
18 Since we use lagged values both in instrumenting for assets and income and of food aid, we must drop 
the June 2000 survey round from the estimation, reducing the sample to six usable panel rounds. 
19 Attrition relates to households dropping out of the survey and not re-appearing in later rounds.  
Interruption reflects a transitory absence from the sample with observations available both before and after 
the period when the household is missing from the data.  19
herd size than the median Kenyan household.  Private transfers are larger in Kenya. 
Although the median household in each country neither gave nor received food transfers, 
the median Kenyan household received some form or transfer. Finally, food aid appears 
more stable for Kenyan households, with the previous quarter’s value similar to the 
current value. However, 85 percent of Kenyan households reported insecurity in the 
previous quarter. Only 17 percent of Ethiopian households reported insecurity in the 
previous quarter. 
Figure 1 shows the portion of total income attributable to public (food aid) and 
private (gifts) transfers to households across quarters. Total transfers composed between 
9 and 19 percent of total median income. While over 40 percent of Ethiopian 
observations receive no transfers, only 6 percent of Kenyan observations received no 
transfers, underscoring the breadth of food aid distribution through CBT in northern 
Kenya.   
Further differences exist by targeting modality (Table 2). The median recipients of 
CBT food aid are more likely to both receive and give higher valued transfers than either 
FFW or FFD recipients. FFW and FFD do not appear to be differently targeted by 
individual indicators such as age, gender of the household head, and number of children 
in the household. The median recipients of all three forms of food aid have lower 
incomes than the median household income in the general population (see Table 1). This 
is not the case with respect to assets for CBT recipients, who hold more livestock than do 
the northern Kenyan households at large. 
 
IV. Econometric Results  20
A. Instrumental Variables 
 
The instrumenting equations for income and assets do well, with r
2of 0.54 and 0.91 
percent, respectively.  Income is positively and significantly related to the previous 
period’s income, ownership of a bank account, and town-based employment. Female 
headed households are poorer, controlling for other household attributes.  Household 
assets are statistically significantly increasing in the prior period’s livestock holdings and, 
as expected, decreasing in livestock deaths during the previous period. See Appendix 
Table 1 for further details on the instrumenting equations. 
 
B. Food Aid Targeting 
Table 3 reports the switching Tobit regression parameter estimates of equation (5), 
explaining the value of food aid received by households.
20  To aid in interpretation of the 
Tobit coefficients, we compute the marginal effect (ME) of each regressor on the 
expected value of food aid by multiplying our coefficients by the probability of being 
uncensored, as shown in the left column (Greene, 2003).  Further, we disaggregate the 
results into the marginal effect on the probability of receiving aid (second column) and 
the marginal effect on the value of aid conditional on receipt (third column) using the 
McDonald- Moffit (1980) decomposition technique.  
The model fits these data reasonably well. A Wald test clearly rejects the null 
hypothesis that there is no relation between the regressors and food aid receipts, with a 
                                                 
20 Across the Tobit equations, N’Gambo is the omitted community in northern Kenya, and Didi Hara is the 
omitted community in southern Ethiopia. The omitted intercept is FFW for the food aid targeting equations. 
In the transfer equations, FFD is omitted.  21
test statistic of 688.26, while the pseudo-r
2, computing as the squared correlation of Y 
and Ŷ, is 0.29.
21   
Targeting modality indeed seems to matter to food aid distribution patterns.  CBT and 
FFW recipients receive less aid, on average, about $10 less per month for CBT 
households and about $3 less for FFW households, as compared against FFD recipients. 
Other than household size, household-specific attributes – assets, income, idiosyncratic 
income and asset shocks, age and gender of the household head – had no discernible 
effect on CBT or FFW flows. A Wald test of the exclusionary restriction that income, 
assets, idiosyncratic shocks, age, age
 squared, number of children, and gender of the 
household head all have coefficients equal to zero cannot be rejected for either CBT or 
FFW flows (with p-values of 0.5613 and 0. 5338, respectively, on the relevant χ
2 test 
statistics), indicating that food aid is not targeted based on household attributes for either 
of these modalities. However, we can readily reject that same joint exclusionary 
restriction null hypothesis for FFD (with a p-value of 0.0001).  In the pastoralist 
communities of northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia, only FFD flows appear strongly 
related to household attributes, as ought to be the case for effective household-level 
targeting of public transfers.   
Household size matters to all food aid flows. CBT flows increase modestly with 
household size as rations were supposed to be based on the number of residents in each 
household.  Note, however, that expected CBT food aid receipts are not increasing when 
household size increases due to the addition of young children, reflecting the fact that the 
rosters used for allocating food aid are often quite dated, missing many children.  FFW 
                                                 
21 Bear in mind that the Tobit model does not maximize the R-squared value, but rather maximizes the log-
likelihood function (Wooldridge, 2002. p. 529).  22
flows likewise increase in household size, likely reflecting the negative effect household 
size exerts on household-specific shadow wages rates, inducing greater self-selection into 
FFW programs among larger households (Barrett and Clay 2003). 
With proper controls in place for community-specific fixed effects, household level 
income and assets, as well as covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, there appears minimal 
inertia in food aid distribution, contrary to past findings from the region that had to rely 
on cross-sectional data (Jayne et al. 2002).  The previous quarter’s food aid was 
positively and significantly related to current food aid receipts only for CBT households, 
and then only for about $0.02 more food aid per week per household.   
Food aid flows appear to flow in relation to community-level, covariate shocks.  CBT 
aid is significantly, negatively related to lagged rainfall, consistent with our qualitative 
field-level observations that food aid shipments into northern Kenya were heavily 
influenced by recent drought. FFW flows, by contrast, were negatively and statistically 
significantly related to both lagged and current period rainfall, consistent with the 
principles of self-targeting under the assumption that lower rainfall reduced the 
opportunity cost (i.e., the shadow wage) of FFW project participants’ time.  Free food 
distribution was strongly negatively related to current period rainfall. 
The fact that food aid flows in response mainly to easily observed rainfall shocks 
rather than to underlying asset or income shocks to which it theoretically ought to 
respond is underscored by the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates 
on covariate asset shocks for both FFD and FFW and on covariate income shocks for 
CBT distribution.  If food aid played an effective insurance role in this setting, it would 
be negatively and significantly related to asset and income shocks.  However, the  23
magnitudes of the estimated effects are quite small under each targeting modality. 
Moreover, if income or assets covary negatively with aid receipts due to unobserved 
common factors, spurious correlation with the instrumenting equation residuals ought to 
bias downwards the coefficient estimates on the shock variables. Therefore, the fact that 
we have no economically and statistically significant, negative estimates of food aid 
flows in response to shocks seems a strong signal.
22 In summary, even at the level of 
covariate shocks, food aid seems to flow mainly in response to observable rainfall events 
rather than as a proper safety net to compensate either for income or asset shocks.  
Food aid flows were nowhere near statistically significantly related to either 
household predicted income or predicted assets under any of the three targeting 
modalities.  That may, however, be due to correlation between household attributes used 
for indicator targeting in many field FFD and FFW programs (e.g., age and gender of 
household head, household size) and income or wealth or between location, used in 
geographic targeting of all food aid, irrespective of targeting modality, and income and 
wealth.  By re-estimating the food aid flows Tobit without controls for household 
indicators
23 and location fixed effects, each of which may effectively proxy for income, 
wealth or asset or income shocks, we can establish whether food aid indeed flows 
progressively, i.e., to needier households.  
                                                 
22 We also tried specifications that included quadratic shock terms to allow for possible nonlinear effects, as 
might occur if flows respond only to relatively substantial shocks, but not to modest perturbations. We 
found no evidence that higher-order polynomial specification in shocks added any explanatory power to the 
simpler linear specification presented here.  
23 We retain attributes not commonly used in targeting (e.g., holding a bank account, in town work, 
receiving food aid in the previous quarter).  24
Table 4 reports the estimates of the specification without controls for household 
attributes or location-specific fixed effects.
24  This specification enables us to check 
whether indicator targeting based on household attributes and geographic targeting based 
on time-invariant community attributes seems effective in reaching the relatively poor, in 
providing insurance against adverse shocks, or both.  As one would expect, there is no 
significant change in the pattern of CBT food aid flows, since these do not employ 
indicator targeting, although now food aid flows now respond negatively and 
significantly to covariate asset shocks, albeit still at a small magnitude.  Nonetheless, 
dropping the household indicators has no discernible effect on CBT’s overall targeting 
efficacy.  Food aid distributed according to community-based targeting does not appear 
to reach the poor very effectively.
25  
By contrast, upon removing location-specific effects and household indicators used in 
targeting, both FFW and FFD flows now appear economically and statistically 
significantly progressive, FFW in response to assets and FFD in response to income.  
FFW also now seems to flow as intended with respect to covariate asset and income 
shocks, and FFD responds negatively to covariate income shocks, although the 
magnitudes remain small on average.  Even idiosyncratic income and asset shocks for 
FFD and idiosyncratic asset shocks for FFW become negative and significant. The 
geographic and household indicators used in targeting FFW and FFD in southern 
Ethiopia indeed appear effective proxies for income and asset measures of welfare such 
that food aid does flow mainly to poorer households and those suffering greater shocks in 
                                                 
24 The results are qualitatively very similar if we retain the location-specific fixed effects.  A table of results 
is available from the authors by request. 
25 As discussed previously, the data do not allow us to discern whether the failure to reach the poor is due to 
targeting mechanism or program placement.  25
southern Ethiopia, although the volumes of food aid involved remain small.  Households 
suffering sharp adverse shocks continue to need informal assistance through social (e.g., 
kinship) networks.  In the next subsection we consider how food aid affects flows within 
these networks. 
 
C. Food Aid’s Effects on Private Transfers 
As previously discussed, we test the crowding out and pass through hypotheses by 
regressing private transfers received and given, respectively, on the fitted values of food 
aid receipts obtained from the regressions just discussed.  We do this for both food 
transfers and for the broader set of all cash, food and livestock transfers.  Furthermore, 
we interact predicted food aid receipts with idiosyncratic and covariate income and asset 
shocks in order to establish whether crowding out or pass through effects vary with 
shocks.  
In this sample, food aid has no economically or statistically significant crowding out 
effect on private transfers. When one looks at all transfers received (Table 5), the point 
estimates for the coefficients on predicted food aid receipts are positive and small, not 
negative and large, as implied by the crowding out hypothesis. Private transfers do appear 
to respond to FFD food aid receipts interacted with covariate asset shocks and to CBT 
food aid interacted with covariate income shocks, but the negative signs implies that 
crowding out only occurs in the presence of positive shocks, i.e., when it is of relatively 
less concern for neutralizing policy interventions.  Moreover, the average effects are quite 
small.  More generally, we reject the joint null hypothesis that all of the food aid terms’ 
coefficients equal zero.  A Wald test that the coefficients of food aid receipts, lagged aid,  26
income and asset shocks interacted with food aid all equal zero can be rejected for both 
CBT food aid recipients (p-value =  0.0207) and FFD food aid receipts (p-value =.0860).  
But given the signs of the point estimates involved, this too offers no support for the 
crowding out hypothesis.
26  When we re-estimate the model using only food transfers 
received as the dependent variable, the resulting point estimates suggest, if anything, a 
modest positive, statistically significant relationship between CBT food aid receipts and 
receipts of private transfers, suggesting modest “crowding in” rather than crowding out of 
private transfers in response to food aid flows.  As less than 15 percent of sample 
observations included receipt of private food transfers, however, we place less stock on 
those estimates.
27   
We likewise find no strong statistical support for the pass through hypothesis on 
which some advocacy of community based targeting rests.  The estimated coefficients 
relating food aid receipts to private transfers given are indeed positive, consistent with the 
hypothesis that increased aid receipts get passed along to others in the form of increased 
outflows of private transfers from the recipient household.  But the magnitudes of the 
point estimates are quite small and statistically insignificantly different from zero.  
Covariate shocks do not have any significant effect on pass through effects associated 
with food aid. Overall, we cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that food aid has no 
effect on total private transfers given at any conventional level of statistical significance. 
The Wald test of the joint exclusionary restriction that all the variables involving food aid 
receipt jointly equal zero cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of statistical 
                                                 
26 There were insufficient observations of FFW food aid recipient households receiving private transfers to 
estimate these effects separately for that targeting modality. 
27 In the interests of conserving space, we omit the tables reporting the regression results for food transfers 
received and food transfers given.  These are available from the authors by request.    27
significance, with p-values of 0.6775 and 0.4778 for CBT and FFD receipts, respectively. 
By contrast, increases in expected income, expected assets and idiosyncratic asset shocks 
result in more transfers by households in FFD communities while higher income and 
assets lead to greater gifts given in CBT communities. 
The same qualitative results obtain when we restrict our attention to just food 
transfers given.  In both FFD and CBT communities, estimated food transfers given 
increases in income, consistent with the views that contributions under social insurance 
schemes will increase with one’s income and that altruistic gifts are a normal good. But 
food aid has no statistically significant pass through effects and the point estimates are 
small in magnitude and, in the case of FFD communities, negative. Shocks still have no 
discernible effect in these data on transfer patterns.  
The overall pattern is that food aid receipts have no significant effect on recipient 
households’ inflows or outflows of private transfers, i.e., there is no strong evidence of 
either crowding out or pass through. Cox et al. argues that long term public transfers may 
render crowding out a “fait acompli” (2004, p. 2194). In other words, in areas like those 
we study, perhaps households have already adjusted their transfer patterns to current 
public transfer levels, leaving only that portion of private transfers that do not respond to 
public transfers. If crowding out affects private transfers primarily when public transfers 
first begin and are largely irreversible thereafter, there may be large crowding out effects 
of de novo public transfer schemes that we cannot capture in this setting, where public 
transfers are familiar, or even expected. The implication, of course, is that, in the long-
term, the ameliorative effect of public transfers to needy households from well-targeted 
food aid to areas already accustomed to inflows of aid is not cancelled out by  28
compensatory reductions in private transfers to those households. It is equally true, 
however, that social networks do not provide an informal corrective mechanism for 
targeting errors in public distribution via pass-through effects.  The net result is to 
underscore the importance of effective targeting of food aid distribution.  
 
V. Conclusions  
This paper addresses several critical but under-researched questions concerning the 
distribution of food aid, and of public transfers more broadly.  Our results corroborate 
previous findings by other authors that food aid is not especially well targeted by income 
or assets at household-level in this region.  They contradict previous findings that public 
transfers crowd out private transfers; we find no evidence of such effects.  
The availability of multiple periods in a panel permits us to look more carefully at 
several important hypotheses.  We find that inertia in household-level food aid 
distribution, while significant, plays less of a role than prior, cross-sectional studies 
suggest.  We also find that food aid flows do not respond significantly to community-
level covariate income or asset shocks. Rather, food aid flows primarily in response to 
rainfall, a highly imperfect proxy for welfare among the population of interest. 
Because food aid was distributed under three different targeting modalities in our 
survey region, we are also able to compare a bit across these methods.  We find that free 
food distribution based on indicator targeting using household attributes seems more 
effective in reaching the poor than self-targeting through food-for-work schemes, which 
is in turn better targeted than food aid distributed following community-based targeting 
methods. However, because CBT’s relatively poorer targeting may be due to program  29
placement effects and local peculiarities of CBT distributions in northern Kenya, rather 
than to CBT as a targeting modality, we encourage caution in interpreting these results as 
indicative of CBT more broadly.  Rather, our findings underscore that targeting is terribly 
difficult, even by communities. We find mild evidence of “pass through” of food from 
CBT food aid recipient households, but the magnitudes involved are far too small to 
compensate for direct targeting errors in the initial distribution of food aid by operational 
agencies.   30
Table 1: Monthly Descriptive Statistics for Food Aid Recipients, by Country 
Variable Median  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
Ethiopia (n=863)          
Food aid value   $0.47  $3.00  $5.57 
Food aid value during previous quarter   $2.73  $4.34  $5.99 
Income   $8.20  $21.46  $38.41 
Monthly Income during previous quarter   $8.42  $20.16  $35.87 
Livestock holdings in TLUs  8.00  12.93  22.73 
Previous quarter's livestock holdings  7.43  12.67  26.60 
Food transfers received   $0.00  $0.08  $0.76 
Food transfers given   $0.00  $0.11  $0.73 
All transfers received   $0.00  $0.64  $4.00 
All transfers given   $0.00  $0.66  $4.14 
Rainfall (in mm)   9.87  11.08  5.27 
Monthly rainfall during previous quarter (in mm)   11.11  11.35  5.31 
Number of children age nine and under  3.00  2.75  1.93 
Number of household members  7.00  4.25  4.25 
Age of household head  45.00  48.93  16.42 
Female headed households    0.29    
Households holding a bank account    0.00    
Households with member working town    0.06    
Insecurity in the community last quarter  0.17    
Kenya (n=697)          
Food aid value   $3.10  $4.38  $4.17 
Food aid value during previous quarter   $2.97  $4.03  $3.87 
Income   $30.50  $66.51  $130.48 
Monthly Income during previous quarter   $30.01  $62.40  $102.22 
Livestock holdings in TLUs  7.53  17.48  39.80 
Previous quarter's livestock holdings  7.58  17.84  39.58 
Food transfers received   $0.00  $0.09  $0.27 
Food transfers given   $0.00  $0.14  $0.33 
All transfers received   $0.32  $3.22  $15.44 
All transfers given   $0.00  $1.25  $3.96 
Rainfall (in mm)   6.43  7.65  7.13 
Monthly rainfall during previous quarter (in mm)   3.93  7.12  7.21 
Number of children age nine and under  2.00  1.93  1.48 
Number of household members  6.00  6.23  2.63 
Age of household head  45.00  46.29  13.52 
Female headed households    0.34    
Households holding a bank account    0.06    
Households with member working town    0.51    
Insecurity in the community last quarter  0.73   
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Table 2: Monthly Descriptive Statistics for Food Aid Recipients, by Targeting 
Modality 
Variable Median  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Received aid from FFW (n=144)          
Food aid value   $5.97  $6.83  $8.41 
Food aid value during previous quarter   $4.49  $5.69  $5.30 
Income   $5.61  $15.20  $24.44 
Monthly Income during previous quarter   $4.83  $12.59  $18.39 
Livestock holdings in TLUs  4.55  7.40  12.08 
Previous quarter's livestock holdings  4.64  7.17  11.42 
Food transfers received   $0.00  $0.02  $0.18 
Food transfers given   $0.00  $0.12  $0.39 
All transfers received   $0.00  $0.77  $5.52 
All transfers given   $0.00  $0.73  $3.93 
Rainfall (in mm)   8.90  8.53  4.69 
Monthly rainfall during previous quarter (in mm)   7.28  8.07  5.44 
Number of children age nine and under  3.00  2.75  1.86 
Number of household members  7.00  8.72  4.76 
Age of household head  50.00  52.30  16.95 
Female headed households    0.34    
Households holding a bank account    0.00    
Households with member working in town    0.07    
Insecurity in community last quarter  0.00    
Received aid from FFD (n=312)          
Food aid value   $3.49  $5.00  $5.39 
Food aid value during previous quarter   $4.48  $6.04  $5.52 
Income   $6.24  $11.80  $21.27 
Monthly Income during previous quarter   $5.84  $15.65  $29.50 
Livestock holdings in TLUs  8.00  10.53  15.30 
Previous quarter's livestock holdings  6.79  11.22  29.19 
Food transfers received   $0.00  $0.06  $0.37 
Food transfers given   $0.00  $0.07  $0.22 
All transfers received   $0.00  $0.58  $3.35 
All transfers given   $0.00  $0.64  $5.07 
Rainfall (in mm)   15.00  13.17  6.40 
Monthly rainfall during previous quarter (in mm)   13.18  13.88  5.55 
Number of children age nine and under  2.00  2.80  1.96 
Number of household members  8.00  8.42  4.33 
Age of household head  45.00  46.69  16.32 
Female headed households    0.37    
Households holding a bank account    0.00    
Households with member working in town    0.05    
Insecurity in community last quarter  0.26    
Received aid from CBT (n=594)          
Food aid value   $3.87  $5.14  $4.07 
Food aid value during previous quarter   $3.35  $4.34  $3.83 
Income   $28.73  $66.29  $137.00 
Monthly Income during previous quarter   $29.18  $61.12  $104.17 
Livestock holdings in TLUs  8.86  19.07  42.73  32
Previous quarter's livestock holdings  8.88  19.53  42.45 
Food transfers received   $0.00  $0.08  $0.22 
Food transfers given   $0.00  $0.14  $0.34 
All transfers received   $0.39  $3.39  $16.26 
All transfers given   $0.04  $1.25  $3.91 
Rainfall (in mm)   3.91  7.24  7.42 
Monthly rainfall during previous quarter (in mm)   3.41  5.82  5.89 
Number of children age nine and under  2.00  1.87  1.43 
Number of household members  6.00  6.23  2.65 
Age of household head  45.00  46.76  13.61 
Female headed households    0.35    
Households holding a bank account    0.06    
Households  with a member working in town    0.50    
Insecurity in community last quarter  0.78    
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value of y    
ME on 
probability 
of y being 




value of y       
Variable  y  =  $4.56      y  = .43     y  = $10.37     Mean 
CBT  -31.9668 ***  -0.9883 ***  -28.5518 ***  0.446795 
CBT* Income ‡   -0.0001    0.0000    -0.0001    89.15 
CBT* Livestock Assets ‡  -0.0005    0.0000    -0.0004    7.81 
CBT*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  900921  *** 58078  *** 679636  ***  -0.00000005 
CBT*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  -2.7613    -0.1780    -2.0831    -0.005117 
CBT*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  0.0007    0.0000    0.0005    0.00000030 
CBT*Hshold Asset Shocks ‡  -0.0257    -0.0017    -0.0194    0.00000002 
CBT*Lagged food aid receipts  0.0694  ***  0.0045  ***  0.0523  ***  5.40 
CBT*Previous quarters’ rainfall   -0.0578  ***  -0.0037  ***  -0.0436  ***  9.54 
CBT*Rainfall (in mm)   0.0033    0.0002    0.0025    10.26 
CBT*Number of children  -0.4601  *  -0.0297  *  -0.3471  *  0.863462 
CBT*No.  household  members  0.4104 ***  0.0265 ***  0.3096 ***  2.79 
CBT*Age of household head  0.0772    0.0050    0.0582    20.68 
CBT*Age
2 of household head  -0.0011    -0.0001    -0.0008    1038.90 
CBT*Female  headed  households  -0.2090   -0.0136   -0.1583   0.152564 
Kargi  0.4984   0.0313   0.3726   0.086538 
Logologo  8.0121 ***  0.3571 ***  5.7249 ***  0.067949 
North  Horr  7.0537 ***  0.3302 ***  5.0424 ***  0.083333 
Suguta  Marmar  2.1492 *  0.1252 *  1.5723 *  0.098718 
FFW  -11.0541 **  -0.6963 **  -9.3858 **  0.353205 
FFW* Income ‡  0.0072    0.0005    0.0055    28.14 
FFW* Livestock Assets ‡  -0.0780    -0.0050    -0.0589    4.93 
FFW*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  -2310809    -148965    -1743226    0.00000004 
FFW*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  1636  *** 105  *** 1234  ***  -0.000057 
FFW*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  0.0050    0.0003    0.0038    0.396500 
FFW*Hshold Asset Shocks ‡  -0.0462    -0.0030    -0.0348    0.112530 
FFW*Lagged food aid receipts  -0.0174    -0.0011    -0.0131    3.57 
FFW*Previous quarter’s rainfall   -0.0918  **  -0.0059  **  -0.0693  **  10.50 
FFW*Rainfall (in mm)   -0.2965  ***  -0.0191  ***  -0.2237  ***  10.49 
FFW*Number of children   -0.4331    -0.0279    -0.3267    0.958974 
FFW*No.  hshld  members  0.1379   0.0089   0.1041   2.99 
FFW*Age of hshold head  0.0855    0.0055    0.0645    17.73 
FFW* Age
2 of household head  -0.0010    -0.0001    -0.0008    984.50 
FFW*Female headed hsholds  -1.6321     -0.1146     -1.2834     0.087179 
FFD* Income ‡  -0.0044    -0.0003    -0.0033    31.15 
FFD* Livestock Assets ‡  0.0380    0.0024    0.0286    6.41 
FFD*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  -2239890  *  -144394  *  -1689726  *  0.00000006 
FFD*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  2964  ***  191  ***  2236  ***  -0.000035 
FFD*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  -0.0037    -0.0002    -0.0028    0.053783 
FFD*Hshold Asset Shocks ‡  0.0160    0.0010    0.0121    0.023503 
FFD*Lagged food aid receipts  0.0292    0.0019    0.0220    5.54 
FFD*Previous quarter’s rainfall   -0.0649    -0.0042    -0.0490    16.49  34
FFD*Rainfall (in mm)   -0.4181  ***  -0.0270  ***  -0.3154  ***  15.91 
FFD*No. of children  0.2766    0.0178    0.2087    1.25 
FFD*No. of household members  -0.1412    -0.0091    -0.1066    3.83 
FFD*Age of household head  -0.4087  ***  -0.0263  ***  -0.3083  ***  22.01 
FFD* Age
2 of household head  0.0035  ***  0.0002  ***  0.0026  ***  1181.24 
FFD*Female headed hsholds  0.2299    0.0147    0.1727    0.128205 
Dillo  5.5907 ***  0.2806 ***  4.0085 ***  0.100000 
Finchawa  -5.2022 ***  -0.4319 ***  -4.9629 ***  0.115385 
Qorate  -1.6974   -0.1190   -1.3340   0.107692 
Wachille  9.1015 ***  0.4009 ***  6.5304 ***  0.115385 
Insecurity in comm. last quarter  0.0815    0.0052    0.0614    0.419872 
Households with a bank account  -1.5611  *  -0.1106  *  -1.2334  *  0.030128 
Households working in town  0.8248     0.0519     0.6168     0.258333 
Wald χ
2 (55)      =    688.68  Pseudo-r
r = 0.292           
Prob > χ
2        =    0.0000  Proportion of observations censored = 0.327     
Notes: For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1.       
*, ** and *** reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.   
‡ indicates an instrumented regressor. 





Table 4: Tobit Estimates for Quarterly Food Aid Receipts (US $), No Household 





value of y    
ME on 
probability 
of y being 




value of y       
Variable  y  =  $8.87     y  = .57     y  = $15.70     Mean 
CBT  -9.471769 ***  -0.3650296 ***  -6.85059 ***  0.446795
CBT* Income ‡   -0.0028694    -0.0001096    -0.0020344    89.1532
CBT* Livestock Assets ‡  0.0276575    0.0010561    0.019609    7.81395
CBT*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  -90022.33    -3437.368    -63825.36    -0.000000049
CBT*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  -8.122905  **  -0.310161  **  -5.759098  **  -0.005117
CBT*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  0.0000656    0.0000025    0.0000465    0.0000003
CBT*Hshold Asset Shocks ‡  -0.0334118    -0.0012758    -0.0236888    0.000000017
CBT* Lagged food aid receipts  0.1931072  ***  0.0073735  ***  0.136912  ***  5.39541
FFW  -14.52949 ***  -0.6016834 ***  -11.08552 ***  0.353205
FFW* Income ‡  0.0180297    0.0006884    0.012783    28.1375
FFW* Livestock Assets ‡  -0.2179996  ***  -0.008324  ***  -0.1545606  ***  4.93289
FFW*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  340064.5    12984.85    241104    0.000000044
FFW*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  -2223.503  ***  -84.90113  ***  -1576.452  ***  -0.000057
FFW*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  0.0044687    0.0001706    0.0031683    0.3965
FFW*Hshold Asset Shocks ‡  -0.1477766  **  -0.0056426  **  -0.1047728  **  0.11253
FFW*Lagged food aid receipts  0.2340333  ***  0.0089362  ***  0.1659284  ***  3.56911
FFD* Income ‡  -0.0630477  ***  -0.0024074  ***  -0.0447005  ***  31.1462
FFD* Livestock Assets ‡  -0.0783382  *  -0.0029912  *  -0.0555414  *  6.41125
FFD*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  -1801635  *  -68792.75  *  -1277350    0.000000056
FFD*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  446.5212    17.04974    316.5812    -0.000035
FFD*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  -0.0348342  ***  -0.0013301  ***  -0.0246973  ***  0.053783
FFD*Hshold Asset Shocks ‡  -0.1828059  **  -0.0069802  **  -0.1296084  **  0.023503
FFD*Lagged food aid receipts  -0.1317195  ***  -0.0050295  ***  -0.0933885  ***  5.54378
Insecurity in comm. last quarter  -0.6738267    -0.0258416    -0.4780428    0.419872
Households with a bank account  -0.529635    -0.0206507    -0.3765638    0.030128
Households working in town  0.1737462     0.006611     0.1231333     0.258333
Wald χ
2 (26)      =    385.35  Pseudo-r
r = 0.091         
Prob > χ
2        =    0.0000  Proportion of observations censored = 0.327     
Notes: For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. 
*, ** and *** reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.   
‡ indicates an instrumented regressor. 
Marginal effects cannot be computed for the constant term. It's coefficient from the Tobit estimation is 25.476***. 
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value of y    
ME on 
probability 
of y being 




of y    
Variable  y  =  $6.82     y  = .21     y  = $32.37  Mean 
CBT*Aid*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  -238569.5  ***  -5722.221  ***  -253294.7  ***  -8.1E-07
CBT*Aid*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  2.799469  *  0.0671468  *  2.97226  *  -0.111263 
CBT*Aid*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  0.0004258    0.0000102    0.0004521    37.9429 
CBT*Aid*Hshold Asset Shocks ‡  -0.0019438    -0.0000466    -0.002064    -1.03353 
CBT*Aid  ‡  0.1821325   0.0043685   0.1933742   5.28572 
CBT  0.7264762   0.0173896   0.769331   0.446795 
CBT* Income ‡   0.005088    0.000122    0.0054021    89.1532 
CBT* Livestock Assets ‡  -0.0500021  *  -0.0011993  *  -0.053088  *  7.81395 
CBT*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  2097660  *  50313.55  *  2227134  *  -4.9E-08
CBT*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  -36.66143    -0.8793449    -38.92428    -0.005117 
CBT*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  -0.0036223    -0.0000869    -0.003846    0.0000003 
CBT*Hshold Asset Shocks ‡  -0.0178934    -0.0004292    -0.018998    1.7E-08 
CBT*Lagged food aid receipts  -0.096801    -0.0023218    -0.102776    5.39541 
CBT*Rainfall (in mm)   0.0159354    0.0003822    0.0169189    10.2602 
CBT*Number of children  0.6906364    0.0165653    0.7332645    0.863462 
CBT*No.  household  members  -0.4649225   -0.0111514   -0.493619   2.78718 
CBT*Age of household head  0.4650951    0.0111556    0.4938021    20.6814 
CBT*Age
2 of household head  -0.0044769    -0.0001074    -0.004753    1038.9 
CBT*Female  headed  households  0.883273   0.0208842   0.9201563   0.152564 
Kargi  2.539418   0.0580981   2.5415   0.086538 
Logologo  1.47051   0.0342624   1.503709   0.067949 
North Horr   0.082524    0.0019762    0.0874249    0.083333 
Suguta  Marmar  9.952963 **  0.2026749 **  8.935922 **  0.098718 
FFW  0.4873485     0.0116492     0.5150547     0.353205 
FFD*Aid*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  -349737.6    -8388.65    -371324.4     0.0000003 
FFD*Aid*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  -629.6517  ***  -15.10255  ***  -668.5156  ***  -0.000551 
FFD*Aid*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  -0.0005201    -0.0000125    -0.000552    -13.9201 
FFD*Aid*HsholdAsset Shocks ‡  -0.0037052    -0.0000889    -0.003934    -4.56428 
FFD*Aid  ‡  0.0817124   0.0019599   0.0867559   3.01177 
FFD*Income‡  0.0188099 *  0.0004512 *  0.0199709 *  31.1462 
FFD* Livestock Assets ‡  -0.1429699  *  -0.0034292  *  -0.151794  *  6.41125 
FFD*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  -3914033    -93880.25    -4155618    5.6E-08 
FFD*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  9214.942  **  221.0255  **  9783.714  **  -0.000035 
FFD*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  0.0256232  ***  0.0006146  ***  0.0272047  ***  0.053783 
FFD*Hshold Asset Shocks ‡  0.0374287    0.0008977    0.039739    0.023503 
FFD*Last quarter's food aid receipts  0.021591    0.0005179    0.0229236    5.54378 
FFD*Rainfall (in mm)   0.023578    0.0005655    0.0250333    15.9113 
FFD*No. of children  -1.700926  ***  -0.0407977  ***  -1.805912  ***  1.25321 
FFD*No. of household members  0.9311008  ***  0.022333  ***  0.988571  ***  3.83077 
FFD*Age of household head  -0.1947338    -0.0046708    -0.206753    22.0071 
FFD* Age
2 of household head  0.0019113    0.0000458    0.0020293    1181.24 
FFD*Female headed hsholds  3.632306    0.0819818    3.582714    0.128205  37
Dillo  0.5693238   0.0135113   0.5959349   0.1 
Finchawa  -2.198498   -0.0549438   -2.482563   0.115385 
Qorate  -3.040611   -0.0773575   -3.540113   0.107692 
Wachille  5.759298     0.1254233     5.477898     0.115385 
Insecurity in comm. last quarter  -0.6271797    -0.0150765    -0.668011     0.419872 
Households with a bank account  1.251802    0.0292307    1.283423    0.030128 
Households working in town  -1.812923  *  -0.0443631  *  -1.982414  *  0.258333 
Wald χ
2 (49)   =    204.29  Pseudo-r
r = .027        
Prob > χ
2        =    0.0000  Proportion of observations censored =.659   
Notes: For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1.     
*, ** and *** reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.   
‡ indicates an instrumented regressor. 
Marginal effects cannot be computed for the constant term. It's coefficient from the Tobit estimation is -73.133***. 
















value of y    
ME on 
probability 
of y being 




value of y       
Variable  y  =  $2.66     y  = .21     y  = $12.78     Mean 
CBT*Aid*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  -46552    -2833    -49768    -0.00000081 
CBT*Aid*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  -0.0020    -0.0001    -0.0022    -0.111263 
CBT*Aid*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  -0.0001    0.0000    -0.0001    37.9429 
CBT*Aid*Hshold Asset Shocks ‡  -0.0012    -0.0001    -0.0013    -1.03353 
CBT*Aid  ‡  0.1404   0.0085   0.1501   5.28572 
CBT  2.6203   0.1543   2.7204   0.446795 
CBT* Income ‡   0.0040  ***  0.0002  ***  0.0042  ***  89.1532 
CBT* Livestock Assets ‡  0.0077    0.0005    0.0083    7.81395 
CBT*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  338037    20570    361388    -0.00000005 
CBT*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  -0.3654    -0.0222    -0.3906    -0.005117 
CBT*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  0.0005    0.0000    0.0005    0.0000003 
CBT*Hshold Asset Shocks ‡  -0.0067    -0.0004    -0.0071    0.000000017 
CBT*Lagged food aid receipts  -0.0196    -0.0012    -0.0210    5.39541 
CBT*Rainfall (in mm)   0.0016    0.0001    0.0017    10.2602 
CBT*Number of children  -0.0150    -0.0009    -0.0161    0.863462 
CBT*No.  household  members  -0.0378   -0.0023   -0.0404   2.78718 
CBT*Age of household head  -0.0922    -0.0056    -0.0986    20.6814 
CBT*Age
2 of household head  0.0008    0.0000    0.0008    1038.9 
CBT*Female  headed  households  0.8136   0.0479   0.8333   0.152564 
Kargi  -0.4740   -0.0295   -0.5247   0.086538 
Logologo  -1.3265   -0.0870   -1.6009   0.067949 
North Horr   -1.8059    -0.1214    -2.2984    0.083333 
Suguta Marmar  0.2956     0.0177     0.3101     0.098718 
FFW  -0.9503     -0.0587     -1.0397     0.353205 
FFD*Aid*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  -129527    -7882    -138475    0.0000003 
FFD*Aid*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  -2.6245    -0.1597    -2.8058    -0.000551 
FFD*Aid*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  -0.0002    0.0000    -0.0002    -13.9201 
FFD*Aid*HsholdAsset Shocks ‡  -0.0015    -0.0001    -0.0016    -4.56428 
FFD*Aid  ‡  0.0406   0.0025   0.0434   3.01177 
FFD*Income‡  0.0065 **  0.0004 **  0.0070 **  31.1462 
FFD* Livestock Assets ‡  0.0346  **  0.0021  **  0.0370  **  6.41125 
FFD*Comm. Income Shocks ‡  -219.68    -13.37    -234.85    0.000000056 
FFD*Comm. Asset Shocks ‡  260.12    15.83    278.09    -0.000035 
FFD*Hshold Income Shocks ‡  0.0048    0.0003    0.0052    0.053783 
FFD*Hshold Asset Shocks ‡  0.1739  ***  0.0106  ***  0.1859  ***  0.023503 
FFD*Last quarter's food aid receipts  0.0168    0.0010    0.0179    5.54378 
FFD*Rainfall (in mm)   -0.0090    -0.0005    -0.0096    15.9113 
FFD*No. of children  0.0588    0.0036    0.0628    1.25321 
FFD*No. of household members  0.1533    0.0093    0.1639    3.83077 
FFD*Age of household head  -0.1007  *  -0.0061  *  -0.1076  *  22.0071 
FFD* Age
2 of household head  0.0006    0.0000    0.0007    1181.24 
FFD*Female headed hsholds  -1.2810  **  -0.0827  **  -1.5058  **  0.128205  39
Dillo  1.4851   0.0845   1.4630   0.1 
Finchawa  -1.7126 **  -0.1133 **  -2.1129 **  0.115385 
Qorate  -2.2680 ***  -0.1550 ***  -3.0205 ***  0.107692 
Wachille  0.6138     0.0363     0.6329     0.115385 
Insecurity in comm. last quarter  -0.6249    -0.0382    -0.6733    0.419872 
Households with a bank account  3.1544  **  0.1651  **  2.8660  **  0.030128 
Households working in town  0.4256     0.0256     0.4475     0.258333 
Wald χ
2 (49)      =    274.54  Pseudo-r
r =  0.076     
Prob > χ
2        =    0.0000  Proportion of observations censored = 0.69     
Notes: For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1.       
*, ** and *** reflect statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.   
‡ indicates an instrumented regressor. 
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Appendix Table 1: Instrumental Variable Estimates for Income and Assets 
   Income    Assets 
Variable  Coef.     z    Coef.    z 
Income during previous quarter   0.8391069  ***  35.1    -      
Livestock holdings in previous quarter  -   -   0.8829061  ***  92.79 
Livestock deaths in previous quarter  -   -   -0.6137341  ***  -7.66 
Rainfall (in mm)   -2.95  ***  -4.5    -0.0381225    -1.12 
Number of children   -5.275965    -1.23    -0.2721433    -1.06 
Number of household members  4.411206  *  1.89    0.2916555  **  2.1 
Age of household head  1.130115    0.58    0.0756191    0.65 
Age
2 of household head  -0.0119882    -0.67    -0.000726    -0.68 
Female  headed  households  -18.98083 *  -1.66    -1.340281 *  -1.94 
Households holding a bank account  68.69457  **  2.19    3.409243  **  1.97 
Insecurity in the community last quarter  223.9972  **  2.22    11.84775  ***  2.32 
Households with member working in town  50.17859  ***  3.4    0.7850939    1.02 
Is the household in Kenya? (1=yes)  -37.6683     -0.81     -1.535462     -0.64 
Note: Time-location effects (interaction terms for 10 locations and 6 quarters) are not reported. 
T-statistics in parentheses            
* Significant at the 10% level.  Overall r
2 = 0.5426    Overall r
2 = 0.9067 
** Significant at the 5% level.  Wald χ
2 (64)  = 1773.28    Wald χ
2 (65) = 10206.56 
*** Significant at the 1% level.  Prob > χ
2  =  0.0000    Prob > χ
2  =  0.0000  42
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